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THE DEVIL'S DISCIPLE AND THE LEARNED
PROFESSION: AMBROSE BIERCE AND THE
PRACTICE OF LAW IN GILDED AGE
AMERICA
J. Gordon Hylton*
I. AMBROSE BIERCE AND THE ANTI-LAWYER TRADITION
A MERICAN attitudes toward lawyers have been persistently am-
bivalent. Since the early days of the Republic, successful lawyers
have been afforded high social status and the citizenry has regularly
turned to the legal profession for political leadership and governmental
expertise." At the same time, there has been a recurring refrain in
American culture of general antipathy toward lawyers, the intensity of
which seems to vary from decade to decade.2 The natural aristocrat
perpetually competes in the popular mind with the pin-striped shark.
For every Abraham Lincoln, there is a Roy Cohn; for every Atticus
Finch, an Arnold Becker.
Perhaps no American has contributed as much to literature of the
anti-lawyer cause as Ambrose Bierce. Although remembered primarily
as the author of a series of macabre, death-obsessed short stories,
Bierce was one of the best known men-of-letters of his day as well as
an influential journalist who wrote vigorously on an array of contempo-
rary issues.3 On the subject of the legal profession and the system of
* Assistant Professor, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B..
Oberlin College, 1974; J.D., University of Virginia, 1977; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1986. Re-
search for this paper was supported by a grant from the Marshall-Ewell Fund of the Illinois
Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author would like to thank Warner
Berthoff of Harvard University for his comments on an earlier version of this paper.
1. R. ABEL AMERICAN LAWYERS 175 (1989); J. HuRst. THE GROWTh OF AM ICAN LAw
THE LAW MAKERS 47 (1950).
2. M. BLOOMFIELD. AMIERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHAttGNo SOCIETY. 1776-1876, at 32-58. 136-
90 (1976). See also Baker, The Lawyer in Popular Fiction, 3 J. POPULAR CULTURE 493-516
(1969).
3. Bierce's interests were catholic. As M.E. Grenander has noted, "international relations,
politics, religion, medicine, business, the pleasures or good food and drink, science, law, and the
war between the sexes" are themes that Bierce turns to again and again, particularly in his short
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justice it administered, Bierce had nothing favorable to say. In his
view, "lawyers" were those "skilled in circumvention of the law," '4
while a "liar" was merely "[a] lawyer with a roving commission.",,
"Justice," according to Bierce, was "[a] commodity which in a more or
less adulterated condition the State sells to the citizen as a reward for
his allegiance, taxes and personal service;"' "litigation" was "[a] ma-
chine which you go into as a pig and come out of as a sausage;"'7 and a
"litigant" was "[a] person about to give up his skin for the hope of
retaining his bones."8 Upon learning that a San Francisco woman had
filed suit against the city for injuries suffered when she feel into an
open sewer, Bierce is said to have remarked, "It is surprising that the
lady should have consented to go into Court; we should suppose that
one adventure in a cesspool would suffice."9
A century later, Bierce's satirical barbs are still regularly cited by
those looking for pithy criticisms of the American legal system. 10 Un-
fortunately, few now take Bierce seriously as a critic of the specific
legal culture of his own day. His antipathy toward law and lawyers is
treated as an essentially timeless disdain to be dismissed, ultimately, as
the product of literary convention and a savagely misanthropic world
view.
Although it is inadequate as a complete explanation of Bierce's
motives, such a judgment is not without some merit. Satire was an im-
portant part of the literary tradition with which Bierce identified. Sat-
ire on lawyers, judges, and legal practices is a venerable literary con-
vention, the forms and modes of which have been fairly stable from
Roman comedy to the commedia dell'arte to Balzac to the present.1"
forms. Grenander, Ambrose Bierce, in 12 DICTIONARY OF LITERARY BIOGRAPHY: AMERICAN
REALISTS AND NATURALISTS 33 (1982). A brief discussion of the theme of "law" in the short
works of Bierce can be found in M.E. GRENANDER. AMBROSE BIERCE 152-55 (1971).
4. 7 A. BIERCE. THE COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE BIERCE: THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 187
(1911).
5. Id. at 191.
6. Id. at 176-77.
7. Id. at 194.
8. Id.
9. O'Brien, Ambrose Bierce, in 1 I DICTIONARY OF LITERARY BIOGRAPHY: AMERICAN HU-
MORISTS. 1800-1950, at 40-41 (1982).
10. A list of recent law review articles citing Bierce includes: Kurland, Earl Warren: Master
of the Revels (Book Review), 96 HARV. L. REV. 331 (1982); Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A
Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855 (1985); Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MIcti. L,
REV. 827 (1988); Posner, Law and the Theory of Finance: Some Intersections, 54 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 159 (1986); Schwartz, Book Review, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 233 (1983).
II. For examples, see 1 THE WORLD"OF LAW: THE LAW IN LITERATURE 415-654 (E. London
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Moreover, there was a near-pathological side to Bierce's personality
that led him to develop intense antipathies. The historian Kevin Starr
has written of Bierce, "He hated democracy and he hated Walt Whit-
man. He hated ministers. If dogs harassed him as he pedaled his bicy-
cle along country roads, he would dismount, draw his pistol and shoot
the offending animal, some times before an astonished owner's eyes.
(Needless to say, Ambrose Bierce hated dogs.)"112 His vitriol was
hardly limited to lawyers, democrats, Walt Whitman, and ministers; it
extended to policemen, doctors, businessmen, and politicians as well.
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to dismiss Bierce's writings on law-
yers and the legal system as mere literary convention or a general man-
ifestation of his misanthropic world view; beneath the humor and the
bitterness of his work lay a sophisticated understanding of the short-
comings of the late nineteenth-century bench and bar. From his arrival
in the state in 1866 until his removal to Washington, D.C. in 1899, he
had ample opportunity, both as participant and critical observer, to
monitor the way justice was dispensed in late nineteenth-century
California.
Behind his sardonic attacks lay a keen intelligence, highly sensitive
to the egregious gap that existed between promise and reality in his
society. Furthermore (and this has never been fully appreciated), his
essays and editorials on legal subjects offered concrete recommenda-
tions, many of which anticipated the reforms that would be associated
with legal progressivism in the twentieth century.13 To appreciate
Bierce's insights nearly a century later, one must understand both
Bierce's view of his own literary mission and the nature of the legal
system in late nineteenth-century California.
ed. 1960). For a discussion of Bierce's connection to the "vituperative" satiric tradition of
Archilochus and Juvenal, as well as an exploration of the connections between his humor and that
of Poe, Melville, Twain, Mencken, Nathanial West, and Henry Miller. see Martin, Ambrose
Bierce, in THE COMIC IMAGINATION IN AMERICAN LITERATURE 195-205 (L Rubin. Jr. ed. 1973).
12. K. STARR. AMERICANS AND THE CALIFORNIA DREAM. 1850-1915. at 273 (1973).
13. "Legal progressivism" refers generally to efforts of reform-minded lawyers to elevate the
standards of their profession, typically by raising the requirements for admission to the bar, by
adopting new measures for controlling the behavior of existing lawyers, and by modernizing out-
dated legal forms and procedures. This movement is generally seen as one asptct of a general
middle class commitment to social reorganization in the early twentieth century. See J.
AUERBACH. UNEQUAL JUSTICE 14-129 (1976); R. HOFSTADTER. ThE AGE OF REFORM 148-63
(1981); J. HURST, supra note 1, at 276-94, 352-75; R. WIEBE. TIlE SEARCH FOR ORDEP. 1877-
1920, at 116-30 (1967).
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II. THE IMAGE OF THE LAWYER IN THE WRITINGS OF AMBROSE
BIERCE
While editing the weekly San Francisco Wasp in the early 1880s,
Bierce began to embellish his column "Prattler" with a series of wittily
cynical epigrams presented under the title "The Devil's Dictionary."
He continued this feature in a variety of publications until 1906 when
his best efforts were collected and published in book form. Many of the
entries dealt with legal subjects, and perhaps best demonstrate the
depth of Bierce's hostility toward legal culture. 4
14. Some notable examples are:
"Habeas Corpus. A writ by which a man may be taken out of jail when confined for the
wrong crime." 7 A. BIERCE, supra note 4, at 126.
"Inadmissible, adj. Not competent to be considered. Said of certain kinds of testimony which
juries are supposed to be unfit to be entrusted with, and which judges, therefore, rule out, even of
proceedings before themselves alone. ... [Bierce continues with a lengthy denunciation of the
prohibition against hearsay evidence, a proscription that he considered contrary to reason and
destitute of value.] Id. at 153-54.
Law, n.
Once Law was sitting on the bench,
And Mercy knelt a-weeping.
"Clear out!" he cried, "disordered wench!
Nor come before me creeping.
Upon your knees if you appear,
'Tis plain your have no standing here."
Then Justice came. His Honor cried:
"Your status?-devil seize you!"
"Amica curiae," she replied-
"Friend of the court, so please you."
"Begone!" he shouted--"there's the door-
I never saw your face before!"
Id. at 186.
"Lawful, adj. Compatible with the will of a judge having jurisdiction." Id.
"Leading question. A leading question is not necessarily an important one; it is one that is so
framed as to suggest, or lead to, the answer desired." Few other than lawyers use the term cor-
rectly. A. BIERCE, WRITE IT RIGHT 40 (1909).
"Precedent, n. In Law, a previous decision, rule or practice which, in the absence of a definite
statute, has whatever force and authority a Judge may choose to give it, thereby greatly simplify-
ing his task of doing as he pleases. As there are precedents for everything, he has only to ignore
those that make against his interest and accentuate those in the line of his desire. Invention of the
precedent elevates the trial-at-law from the low estate of a fortuitous ordeal to the noble attitude
of a dirigible arbitrament." 7 A. BIERCE, supra note 4, at 262.
"Technicality, n. In an English court a man named Home was tried for slander in having
accused a neighbor of murder. His exact words were: 'Sir Thomas Holt hath taken a cleaver and
stricken his cook upon the head, so that one side of the head fell upon one shoulder and the other
side upon the other shoulder.' The defendant was acquitted by instruction of the court, the learned
judges holding that the words did not charge murder, for they did not affirm the death of the
cook, that being only an inference." Id. at 340-41.
"Trial, n. A formal inquiry designed to prove and put upon record the blameless characters
[Vol. 23:705
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Bierce's "definitions" voice criticisms of law and lawyers common
not just in Bierce's day but throughout American history: specifically,
that judges are arbitrary, that the bar lacks integrity, that common law
procedure tends to be obstructionist in nature, that greedy representa-
tives abuse the legislative process, that legal rules and legal fictions are
contrary to ordinary reason, and that the legal system prefers technical
niceties over substantive justice. The same themes run through the mis-
cellaneous epigrams that pepper Bierce's writing and appear in his po-
etry. "Death is not the end; there remains the litigation over the es-
tate, 1 5 was a typically Bierceian observation, while the poetic
fragment "An Error" sounded a favorite theme, the corruption of the
judiciary.
"I never have been able to determine
Just how it is that the judicial ermine
Is safely guarded from predacious vermin."
"It is not so, my friend; though in a garret
'Tis kept in camphor, and you often air it,
The vermin will get into it and wear it."1 6
Similar examples can be found in his 1889 collection Fantastic
Fables. Bierce's fables were vignettes used to mock (and to attack)
middle class values and attitudes. The entry "Judge and Plaintiff" fo-
cused on the corruption that Bierce saw running throughout the legal
system.
A Man of Experience in Business was awaiting the judg-
ment of the Court in an action for damages that he had
brought against a railway company. The door opened and the
Judge of the Court entered.
"Well," said he, "I am going to decide your case to-day.
If I should decide in your favor I wonder how you would ex-
press your satisfaction."
"Sir," said the Man of Experience in Business, "I should
risk your anger by offering you one-half the sum awarded."
of judges, advocates and jurors. In order to effect this purpose it is necessary to supply a contrast
in the person of one who is called the defendant, the prisoner, or the accused.... In our day the
accused is usually a human being, or a socialist.. . ." Id. at 349.
"'Truthful, adj. Dumb and illiterate." Id. at 353.
15. 8 A. BIERCE THE COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE BIERCE_ NEGUGILE TALES. ON WITH
THE DANCE. EPIGRAMS 365 (1911).
16. 4 A. BIERCE. THE COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE BIERCE SHAPES OF CLAY 361 (1910).
1991]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
"Did I say I was going to decide that case?" said the
Judge, abruptly, as if awakening from a dream. "Dear me,
how absent-minded I am! I mean I have already decided it,
and judgment has been entered for the full amount that you
sued for."
"Did I say I would give you one-half?" said the Man of
Experience in Business, coldly. "Dear me, how near I came to
being a rascal! I mean that I am greatly obliged to you." 1
Bierce's hostility toward the style of argument known as "legal
reasoning" formed the basis for a second fable, "A Defective Petition."
An Associate Justice of the Supreme Court was sitting by
a river when a Traveler approached and said:
"I wish to cross. Will it be lawful to use this boat?"
"It will," was the reply; "it is my boat."
The Traveler thanked him, and pushing the boat into the
water embarked and rowed away. But the boat sank and he
was drowned.
"Heartless man!" said an Indignant Spectator. "Why did
you not tell him that your boat had a hole in it?"
"The matter of the boat's condition," said the great ju-
rist, "was not brought before me. "18
The practice of law was also a proper subject for this type of sat-
ire. In "Deceases and Heirs" Bierce addressed the way in which a law-
suit could swallow up the initial cause of action, a common event in the
California courts of his day. Like much of Bierce's work, the fable re-
volves around a death.
A Man died leaving a large egtate and many sorrowful
relations who claimed it. After some years, when all but one
had had judgment given against them, that one was awarded
the estate, which he asked his Attorney to have appraised.
"There is nothing to appraise," said the Attorney, pocket-
ing his last fee.
"Then," said the Successful Claimant, "what good has all
this litigation done me?"
"You have been a good client to me," the Attorney re-
17. 6 A. BIERCE. THE COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE BIERCE: THE MONK AND THE HANG-
MAN'S DAUGHTER, FANTASTIC FABLES 234 (1911).
18. Id. at 294.
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plied, gathering up his books and papers, "but I must say you
betray a surprising ignorance of the purpose of litigation."' ,,
Bierce's attitude toward law and lawyers expressed in these short
forms carried over into his longer writings. His poem "To an Insolent
Attorney," while not a particularly successful literary effort, contains a
much more detailed indictment of the legal profession than was possi-
ble in the shorter works.20 The poem, originally written for newspaper
publication, was addressed to the well-known San Francisco criminal
defense attorney, Hall McAllister. For sixty-eight lines Bierce satirizes
McAllister and his profession for attempting to raise to the level of
virtue their willingness to "Calumniate and libel at the will / Of any
villain who can pay the bill."' In the style of Alexander Pope, Bierce
wrote:
Happy the lawyer!-at his favored hands
Nor truth nor decency the world demands.
Secure in his immunity from shame,
His cheek ne'er kindles with the tell-tale flame.
His brains for sale, morality for hire,
In every land and century a licensed liar 2
Bierce counted the legal profession's role as "hired guns" as one of
the major illnesses of society. He had no sympathy whatsoever for the
argument that a client's guilt or innocence ought to be of no concern to
his attorney; for Bierce the legal profession's proclaimed "neutrality"
was nothing more than a sign of moral bankruptcy. The closing stanza
of "To An Insolent Attorney" proclaims:
I grant you, if you like, that men may need
The services performed for crime by greed,-
Grant that the perfect welfare of the State
Requires the aid of those who in debate
As mercenaries lost in early youth
The fine distinction between lie and truth-
19. Id. at 234. Other "fables" dealing with law or legal matters in 6 A. BIERCE. supra note 17,
include A Hasty Settlement (at 184-85); The Party Over There (at 194-95); The Tried Assassin
(at 203); The No Case (at 230); An Unspeakable Imbecile (at 248); A Fatal Disorder (at 273-
74); The Justice and His Accuser (at 276-77); Snake and Swallow (at 347); and Lion and Mouse
(at 363-64).
20. 5 A. BIERCE. THE COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE BIERCE: BLACK BEETLES IN AMBER
240-42 (1911).




Who cheat in argument and set a snare
To take the Feet of Justice unaware,--
Who serve with livelier zeal when rogues assist
With perjury, embracery (the list
Is long to quote) than when an honest soul,
Scorning to plot, conspire, intrigue, cajole,
Reminds them (their astonishment how great!)
He'd rather suffer wrong than perpetrate.
I grant in short, 'tis better all around
That ambidextrous conscience abound
In courts of law to do the dirty work
That self-respecting scavengers would shirk.
What then? Who serves however clean a plan
By doing dirty work, he is a dirty man!23
Bierce's most successful use of the anti-lawyer theme for artistic
purposes was his short story "The Famous Gilson Bequest, 24 which is
one of the handful of his "civilian" stories that matches the power and
intensity of his Civil War tales. It also anticipates by more than two
decades Mark Twain's better-known short story, "The Man That Cor-
rupted Hadleysburg. 25
"The Famous Gilson Bequest"28 is the story of a small-town horse
thief who, though hanged, extracts a final measure of revenge by leav-
ing a will which plays upon the greed of his accusers. While the setting
is the American west of the mid-nineteenth century, Bierce's themes
originated in classical satire. Avarice is easily aroused in men; once
aroused, it becomes their ruling passion. Individual greed and society's
greed are closely interrelated. When the two are combined in law, so-
cial institutions are corrupted.27
23. Id. at 242. While McAllister was a special target of Bierce's invective, he was hardly the
only one. Of the equally prominent William H. L. Barnes, a former Union general, Beirce wrote:
"To W.H.L.B./ Refrain, dull orator, from speaking out,/ For silence deepens when you raise the
shout;/ But when you hold your tongue we hear, at least,/ Your noise in mastering that little
beast." K. JOHNSON. THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF SAN FRANCISCO: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS.
1872-1972, at 15-16 (1972).
24. 2 A. BIERCE. THE COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE BIERCE: IN THE MIDST OF LIFE 266-80
(1909).
25. "The Man That Corrupted Hadleysburg" was written in 1899 and published the following
year. Bierce's story first appeared in the magazine ARGONAUT on October 26, 1878. See ME.
GRENANDER. supra note 3, at 89.
26. 2 A. BIERCE, supra note 24, at 266-80. The phrases in quotation marks in the ensuing
discussion of this short story are excerpted from this source.
27. For an insightful discussion of the story, see M.E. GRENANDER, supra note 3, at 89-92.
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The story begins with the pronouncement, "It was rough on Gil-
son." Gilson had been led into the western mining town of Mammon
Hill that very morning by the town's leading citizen and publicly
charged with horse stealing. So unanimous is the town on the question
of Gilson's guilt that the sheriff begins preparation for a hanging and
the undertaker employs himself, between drinks, with the construction
of a pine casket. All that stands between Gilson and eternity is "the
decent formality of a trial."
Gilson had come to Mammon Hill only recently, leaving his prior
residence, the town of New Jerusalem, after the local vigilance com-
mittee had advised him that his prospects might be better elsewhere.
Gilson, though, cannot shed his tainted reputation because a subse-
quent discovery of new gold fields near Mammon Hill brings most of
the population of New Jerusalem to his new home. He becomes a sus-
picious figure in Mammon Hill, partly because of his familiarity with a
sizeable part of the town's recently swelled population, and partly be-
cause he had never been known to do an honest day's work at "any
industry sanctioned by the stern local code of morality except draw
poker." What makes him even more suspicious is that his losings at the
town's faro table clearly exceed any winnings he might have accumu-
lated from his poker playing. The common conjecture is that Gilson is
responsible for the rash of late night robberies of gold dust from the
sluice boxes of the area.
No one is more convinced of Gilson's complicity in these recent
events than Henry Clay Brentshaw, the town's leading citizen. His per-
sistent avowals of his belief in Gilson's guilt, and his valuable pa-
tronage, eventually induce the operator of the town's leading establish-
ment, the saloon, to bar Gilson from the premises. Cut off from his
place of employment, Gilson is forced to look for new work. Suddenly,
the sluice boxes are no longer molested. However, the lull is brief. Af-
ter a few unsuccessful efforts at highway robbery, Gilson begins a new
career as a horse thief, only to have it end abruptly on a misty, moonlit
night when he is apprehended by Brentshaw with a bay mare belonging
to a Mr. Harper in his possession. His arrest, trial, conviction, sentence,
and hanging quickly follow.
However, before his execution Gilson writes his last will and testa-
ment, bequeathing everything he owned to his "lawfle execketer, Mr.
Brentshaw" on the condition that Brentshaw see to his burial. While
removing the body from the hanging tree, Brentshaw discovers in Gil-
son's pocket a codicil to the will stipulating that anyone who could
1991]
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prove in a court of law during the next five years that he (Gilson) had
robbed sluice boxes was to be his "heir." If his guilt could not be le-
gally proved, the entire estate (minus court expenses) was to go to
Brentshaw.
Because everyone assumed Gilson to be a pauper the will and codi-
cil were treated as an amusing joke. Its peculiar scheme which made
Brentshaw both executor and conditional legatee was approved by the
provisions of a law hastily passed by "a facetious legislature." (It was
later discovered that this statute also created three or four lucrative
political offices and authorized the expenditure of a considerable sum of
public money for the construction of a railway bridge "that with
greater advantage might perhaps have been erected on the line of some
actual railway.") But to everyone's surprise, a merely formal search of
Gilson's papers revealed that he was far from a pauper and, in fact,
had substantial financial holdings in the East.
Immediately, "the country rose as one man" to establish Gilson's
involvement with the raided sluice boxes. Brentshaw, forced into the
position of the defender of Gilson's integrity, was equal to the chal-
lenge. Not to be outdone, he erected a costly monument over his bene-
factor's grave containing an epitaph of his own composition, "eulogiz-
ing the honesty, public spirit and cognate virtues of him who slept
beneath, 'a victim to the unjust aspersions of Slander's viper brood.'"
He also employed the best available legal talent and for five years the
territorial courts were occupied with litigation growing out of the Gil-
son bequest. All sides unabashedly resorted to corruption, bribery, and
perjury, and the battle was not confined to the courts; it raged in "the
press, the pulpit, the drawing room, the mart, the exchange, the school;
in the gulches, and on street corners." The furor created by the will
was unceasing, "but Mr. Brentshaw was victorious all along the line."
True, after five years Brentshaw had vanquished all of the will's
challengers, but this frontier version of the chancery suit in Bleak
House took a heavy toll. Gilson's entire estate was consumed by a pro-
cession of highly paid lawyers, bribed judges, and paid witnesses. In the
process, Brentshaw ruined himself physically, emotionally, and intellec-
tually. His once careless good humor had given place to "a fixed habit
of Melancholy" and his "firm, vigorous intellect had overripened into
the mental mellowness of second childhood." His broad understanding
had narrowed to the accommodation of a single idea: that Gilson had
in fact been innocent of everything. No longer able to grasp that this
innocence was founded on perjured testimony for which he had paid
[Vol. 23:705
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dearly, Brentshaw was overcome by remorse, convinced at last that he
had hounded an innocent man to his death. In his weakened mental
state he came to believe that Gilson's innocence was "the one great
central and basic truth of life-the sole serene verity in a world of
lies."
In the story's final scene, Brentshaw returns at night to the grave-
yard where Gilson is buried. Obsessed with Gilson's "innocence," he
broods over the inadequacy of his efforts. Meanwhile, heavy rains and a
flooded creek have nearly destroyed the cemetery, and a number of cof-
fins are exhumed. Suddenly, Brentshaw's world collapses when he real-
izes once again that Gilson was in fact guilty. As he stares into the
mist covering Gilson's now open grave Brentshaw sees, or thinks he
sees (the narrator confesses uncertainty), the ghost of Milton Gilson
busily robbing the other open coffins of their dust and adding it to his
own, faithfully imitating all the movements of a miner washing gold
dust in his pan. The violent reversal of what had become his most cher-
ished conviction is too much for Brentshaw. The story ends with the
narrator's observation:
Perhaps it was a phantasm of a disordered mind in a fe-
vered body. Perhaps it was a solemn farce enacted by prank-
ing existences that throng the shadows lying along the border
of another world. God knows; to us is permitted only the
knowledge that when the sun of another day touched with a
grace of gold the ruined cemetery of Mammon Hill his kindli-
est beam fell upon the white, still face of Henry Brentshaw,
dead among the dead.28
Like "The Man That Corrupted Hadleysburg," "The Famous Gil-
son Bequest" is about avarice. Both stories reflect a general disenchant-
ment with the human race. However, Bierce's tale is also an indictment
of the political and legal structures of the time. "The Famous Gilson
Bequest" depicts a legal system whose primary function is to increase
the opportunities for corruption. Legal institutions come into play (or
even existence) only when they offer some illicit benefit to those who
invoke them. Greed and the law are symbiotic. Once the town agrees
that Gilson is responsible for the pilferage of the sluice boxes, his pun-
ishment is ostracism from the town's "cultural" center. The decision
that he must hang actually precedes his apprehension by Brentshaw.
28. 2 A. BIERCE. supra note 24, at 279-80.
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Any legal protection for the accused that might exist in theory is sim-
ply ignored. The only protection afforded Gilson is the opportunity for
revenge through a shrewdly drafted will.
The will's unusual distribution scheme is legitimized by an act of
the town's legislature, but the implication is that the problem with the
will is only an excuse to rush through an act that would drain the pub-
lic coffers for the creation of a few unnecessary public jobs and the
construction of a needless railroad bridge. The formal court machinery
is brought into play only when it is discovered that Gilson's will has the
potential of offering undeserved riches to someone. The ludicrous series
of trials that follow are characterized by those features that most irri-
tated Bierce: overpaid attorneys, corrupt judges, perjured testimony,
and costly and seemingly endless litigation.
Whatever virtue or merit the town or Mammon Hill once pos-
sessed is obliterated by the fight over legal title to Gilson's assets.
When the statute of limitations imposed by the will finally expires, the
narrator notes that "the sun went down upon a region in which the
moral sense was dead, the social conscience callous, the intellectual ca-
pacity dwarfed, enfeebled, and confused!" 29
For Bierce, the legal system of Mammon Hill is a microcosm of
the American legal system of the late nineteenth century. That Brent-
shaw was able to outdo all of his opponents in the courtroom, but lose
his bounty and sanity in the process, is evidence of Bierce's disapproval
of the entire mess. The existence of the so-called rule of law means
nothing in practice; the blind goddess is, in fact, blind, and her sup-
posed impartiality aids only the selfish. Brentshaw's ironic death was
Bierce's commentary on the facile homily that the "end of the law is
justice." Under Bierce's critical theories the use of literature for the
purposes of reform was an anathema, but he was not above using his
literary efforts to vent his anger with what he considered to be the legal
follies of his age.30
Bierce's writings about lawyers still seem to strike a responsive
chord with readers (at least with non-lawyers). However, to appreciate
the extent to which they are also a specific attack on the legal system
of his day, it is necessary to look at Bierce's background, his particular
theories of the role of literature, and his experiences with the legal cul-
ture of California.
29. Id. at 275.
30. M.E. GRENANDER. supra note 3, at 92.
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III. AMBROSE BIERCE: A BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL SKETCH
Ambrose Gwinnett Bierce was born on June 24, 1842 on a farm in
southeastern Ohio, the son of Marcus Aurelius and Laura Sherwood
Bierce, who had left their native New England for the West. 31 Am-
brose was the tenth of thirteen children, each of whom were given
names beginning with the letter A. In 1846, the family migrated to
northern Indiana where Bierce grew to adulthood. In 1861, at age eigh-
teen, he enlisted as a private in the Ninth Indiana Infantry and over
the next four years was involved in some of the bloodiest fighting of the
Civil War including the battles at Shiloh, Stones River, Chickamauga,
Missionary Ridge, and Kennesaw Mountain. Repeatedly cited for brav-
ery under fire, Bierce was shot in the head in 1864, survived, and re-
turned to combat. By the end of the war he had been promoted to first
lieutenant.
After the collapse of the Confederacy he briefly worked as a
United States Treasury agent in Alabama before joining his wartime
commander, General William Hazen, on an Army topographical mis-
sion from Omaha, Nebraska to the West Coast. (Bierce had studied
engineering and surveying at the Kentucky Military Institute from
1859 to 1860 and had served as a topographical engineer on Hazen's
staff.) He resigned from the army when he reached San Francisco in
late 1866, apparently out of anger at not receiving a promised commis-
sion as a captain. He took a job as a night watchman at the San Fran-
cisco Mint and began to read voraciously from the works of Shake-
speare, Swift, Voltaire, La Rochefoucauld, Balzac, and Thackeray. By
the summer of 1868, he had begun to place his own poems, essays, and
humorous sketches in California, Golden 'Era, Alta California, and
other local newspapers and magazines.
In December 1868, he became the editor of the San Francisco
News Letter and California Advertiser, the first of several journalistic
31. The standard biographical works about Bierce are: A- DE CAsTRo. PORTRAIT OF AMBROSE
BIERCE (1929); P. FATOuT. AMBROSE BIERCE. THE DEVIL's LEXICOGRAPHER (1951) [hereinafter
P. FATOUT. THE DEvIL's LEXICOGRAPHER]; P. FATOUT. AMBROSE BIERCE AND THE BLACK HILLS
(1956) [herinafter P. FATOUT. THE BLACK HILLS]; C. MCIVLLIAMs. AMBROSE BIERCE (1929); W.
NEALE. LIFE OF AMBROSE BIERCE (1929); and R. O'CoNNOR. AMBROSE BIERCE. A BIOGRAPHY
(1967). Other biographical information is contained in ME. GRENANDER. supra note 3, at 23-36;
Davidson, Ambrose Bierce, in 74 DICTIONARY OF LITERARY BIOGRAPIIY. AMERICAN SHORT
STORY WRITERS BEFORE 1880, at 21-29 (1988); Grenander, Ambrose Blerce. in 71 DICTIONARY
OF LITERARY BIOGRAPHY: AMERICAN LITERARY CRITICS AND SCHOLARS. 1880-1900. at 27-37
(1988); Nundt, Ambrose Bierce, in 23 DICTIONARY OF LITERARY BIOGRAPiY AMERICAN NEWs-
PAPER JOURNALISTS. 1873-1900, 16-25 (1983); and O'Brien, supra note 9. at 38-48.
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posts he would hold in that city. As editor, he authored a weekly col-
umn, "The Town Crier," in which he attacked "hypocrisy, cant, and all
other sham," with particular attention paid to preachers, politicians,
rival editors, lawyers, police, and "all unpleasant people generally."3 2
His first short story, "The Haunted Valley," was published in Bret
Harte's Overland Monthly in July 1871.
The following March, Bierce and his bride of three months left
San Francisco for England where he garnered some attention as a jour-
nalist and an author. He published three volumes of his own writings
and William Gladstone was said to be one of his admirers. His wife's
disenchantment with England, however, led them to return to San
Francisco in 1875. Back in his adopted city, Bierce began a column,
"The Prattler," for Frank Pixley's new magazine, the Argonaut. He
was to remain in the Bay area until the late 1890s, save for a several
month stint in 1880 in South Dakota as the general agent for a mining
company.
In 1881, he became the editor-in-chief of the Wasp, a weekly
newspaper that became a forum for his own writings and for his at-
tacks on the "Big Four" of California-Mark Hopkins, Leland
$tanford (as Bierce spelled it), Collis P. Huntington, and Charles
Crocker-who through their control of the Central Pacific and South-
ern Pacific Railroads, dominated the state's economic and political
life.3 3 Already a member of the artistically oriented Bohemian Club, it
was during this decade that Bierce became widely regarded as the first
citizen of literary San Francisco.
Bierce lost his position as editor when the Wasp was sold in 1886,
but the following year he was hired by the young William Randolph
Hearst to write for the San Francisco Examiner. In 1892, he published
his first collection of short stories, Tales of Soldiers and Civilians
(later retitled In the Midst of Life), a work which was well-received on
both sides of the Atlantic and which led its author to be compared
favorably with Hawthorne and Poe. The remainder of the 1890s saw
the publication of most of Bierce's best recognized works: The Monk
and the Hangman's Daughter (1892), Black Beetles in Amber (1892),
Can Such Things Be? (1893), and Fantastic Fables (1899).
In 1896, Bierce was sent by Hearst to Washington, D.C. to lead
the opposition to a proposed railroad refunding act supported by Collis
32. O'Brien, supra note 9, at 40. The words in quotations are attributed to Bierce.
33. An early account by a contemporary of Bierce of the deeds and misdeeds of the Big Four
is found in 3 G. MYERS. THE HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES 124-45 (1910).
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Huntington. The act, which would have written off 130 million dollars
of government loans to railroads, was defeated in part because of
Bierce's exposes of the true motive behind the bill-the greed of
"railrogues" like Huntington-that appeared in the Examiner and the
Hearst-owned New York Journal. In 1899, Bierce, still in the employ
of Hearst, left San Francisco permanently and returned to Washington
where he lived until 1913. In 1906, his best-known work, The Devil's
Dictionary, was published (originally under the title The Cynic's Word
Book).
After ending his association with Hearst in 1909, Bierce undertook
the preparation of a twelve-volume edition of his Collected Works, a
project that he completed in 1912. In October 1913, at the age of sev-
enty-one, he toured the Civil War battlefields of his youth and then
embarked for Mexico where he planned to join the revolutionary forces
of Pancho Villa as an observer.34 His last known letter was written on
December 26, 1913, from Chihuahua, Mexico, a town captured by
Villa on the eighth of December. Although the date and circumstances
of his death are shrouded in mystery, it is most likely that Bierce was
killed in the battle of Ojinaga (mentioned as his next destination in the
letter of December 26th) which took place on January 11, 1914.31
Since his death, Bierce has suffered the fate afforded to writers
whose lives are commonly judged to have been more interesting than
the body of their written work. While his life continues to be a source
of fascination for many, his works are rarely read.30 Literary critics
who have evaluated his work have not always been favorable in their
judgments. As Marcus Cunliffe pointed out almost three decades ago,
there have been two standard views of Ambrose Bierce, the writer.3 7
According to the more favorable one, he is the best of the American
writers who chose the American Civil War as the setting for their fic-
34. It was this decision that prompted Bierce's frequently cited letter to his niece in which he
wrote:
Good-bye---if you hear of my being stood up against a Mexican stone %all and shot to
rags please know that I think that a pretty good way to depart this life. It beats old age,
disease, or falling down the cellar stairs. To be a Gringo in Mexico-ah, that is
euthanasia!
THE LETrTERS OF AMBROSE BIERCE 196-97 (B. Pope ed. 1922).
35. An imaginative reconstruction of the final days of Ambrose Bierce is the subject of Carlos
Fuentes' novel The Old Gringo, originally published in Spanish as El Gringo Viejo (1985).
36. A recent example of the fascination about Bierce's life is the motion picture. Old Gringo
(Columbia Pictures 1989), featuring Gregory Peck as Bicrce.




tion.38 The second, and more common, verdict is that he was "a cynical
misanthrope, morbidly concerned with violent death and the supernatu-
ral." 39 His most fervent admirers, however, offer a third evaluation. In
this view, Bierce is a major representative of the "dark" tradition of
American literature. As the link between his predecessors Poe, Haw-
thorne, and Melville, and modern writers like Faulkner and Flannery
O'Connor, Bierce's powerful psychological insights into bizarre human
behavior operated as an antidote to the narrowly realistic (and essen-
tially optimistic) outlook that dominated American literature in the pe-
riod between the Civil War and World War 1.40
Bierce's choice of genres did little for his critical reputation. He
pledged his allegiance to what he viewed as the major tradition in En-
glish and American literature-essentially, the literary forms of the
eighteenth century, especially satire-and to a finely-wrought, rapier-
like prose. This commitment led him to work with what strikes twenti-
eth-century readers as rather unconventional forms. He eschewed the
38. Bierce was the only major American writer who both fought in and wrote about the
American Civil War. On Bierce's contribution to the literature of the war, see D. AARON, THE
UNWRITTEN WAR 181-92 (1973); E. WILSON. PATRIOTIC GORE 617-34 (1962). Bierce's only peer
among American writers who set their imaginative works during the Civil War is Stephen Crane,
who consciously modelled his accounts of warfare on Bierce's writings. Davidson, supra note 31,
at 27. Bierce himself detested Crane's novel The Red Badge of Courage, calling it a "freak" and
asserting that the only writer worse than Stephen Crane "would be two Stephen Cranes."
O'Brien, supra note 9, at 45.
39. 0' Brien, supra note 9, at 45. For the conventional view, see THE LITERATURE OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 760 (A. Quinn ed. 1951); K. STARR, supra note 12. A more judicious evalua-
tion can be found in W. BERTHOFF, THE FERMENT OF REALISM: AMERICAN LITERATURE. 1884-
1919, at 76-79 (1965). A collection of critical essays on Bierce from his own day until the 1980s is
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON AMBROSE BIERCE (C. Davidson ed. 1982).
40. R. WIGGINS. AMBROSE BIERCE 44-46 (1964). In his own day, Bierce's strongest advocate
among major American critics was the Baltimore-based Percival Pollard who referred to Bierce as
"the one commanding figure in our time." P. POLLARD, THEIR DAY IN COURT (1909) (quoted in
W. BERTHOFF, supra note 39, at 77). Foremost among recent critics arguing for a broader under-
standing of Bierce's work are M.E. Grenander and Cathy N. Davidson. Grenander has argued
that Bierce is most properly studied in the context of turn-of-the-century literary impressionism,
rather than the more mainstream American movements of literary realism and literary natural-
ism. Grenander justifies this characterization because of Bierce's concentration on the subjective
perceptions of his protagonists and his use of moments of epiphany through which they come to
understand reality. M.E. GRENANDER, supra note 3, at 152-55. Davidson emphasizes the "mod-
ern" qualities of Bierce's stories, i.e., "[h]is surrealistic literary techniques and rhetorical
presentations of subjective and objective time," "his juxtaposition of multiple points of view and
often contradictory perspectives," and "his expositions of the deceptions that the mind plays upon
itself." Davidson, supra note 31, at 27-28; C. DAVIDSON. THE EXPERIMENTAL FICTIONS OF AM-
BROSE BIERCE (1984). Undoubtedly, much of the renewed interest in Bierce's work is the result of
his popularity with contemporary writers as varied as Ryunosuke Akutagawa, Jorge Luis Borges,
Brigid Brophy, Julio Cortazar, and Carlos Fuentes.
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novel as "[a] short story padded"; he had no interest in drama; and,
though he wrote poetry, he knew he was no poet.41 Instead, he devoted
his efforts to raising the aphorism, the dictionary definition, the fable,
and the newspaper editorial to the level of art.42
Bierce's reputation has also suffered from his hostility to realism,
the dominant literary movement of his own time. Although William
Dean Howells, the dean of American realism, praised certain aspects of
Bierce's work, Bierce had no use for Howells's literary theories, brand-
ing realism "[t]he art of depicting nature as it is seen by toads. 43
Moreover, while his stories depict the carnage of war quite graphically,
Bierce was concerned with a type of psychological realism that caused
him to be indifferent to (or at least to downplay) the types of realistic
detail that characterized the works of contemporaries like Howells,
Norris, and Herrick. His refusal to work in the realist mode has also
caused most modern critics, including his supporters, to ignore the as-
pects of his work that operate on the level of social criticism.
IV. AMBROSE BIERCE IN COURT
As a newspaperman, Bierce had ample opportunity to observe
firsthand the goings-on in the courts of the city of San Francisco. Fur-
thermore, while he cultivated the image of outraged observer, he also
had his own experiences with the legal system. As an abrasive writer
notorious for his indifference to whom he offended, Bierce had frequent
occasion to consider the legal system, either as a potential defendant in
an action for libel or as a potential victim of physical retaliation. He
was frequently threatened and, on at least one occasion, beaten up by
41. 7 A. BIERCE, supra note 4, at 231. Bierce did acknowledge Hawthorne's distinction be-
tween the "novel" and the "romance," and he wrote sympathetically of the latter in his essay
"The Novel." Grenander, supra note 31, at 35.
42. Recently, critics have begun to acknowledge that Bierce cannot be fully appreciated if one
applies only the traditional categories. M.E. Grenander has observed that scholars and critics have
"begun to recognize that their theoretical concepts must be expanded if they are to include a
writer as nonconformist as Ambrose Bierce." Grenander, supra note 31, at 35.
43. 7 A. BIERCE supra note 4, at 276. On the relationship of Bierce and Howells, see Gre-
nander, supra note 3, at 33; Grenander, supra note 31, at 32-33. When informed that Howells. in
a lecture at Columbia University, had stated that "Mr Biercc is among our three greatest writ-
ers," Bierce is said to have replied, "I am sure Mr. Howells is the other two." C McWiLWAMts.
supra note 31, at 219. Bierce referred to Howells and Henry James (who were apparently linked
in his mind) as "Miss Nancy Howells" and "Miss Nancy James, Jr." and as "two eminent triflers
and cameo-cutters-in-chief to Her Littleness the Bostonese small virgin." PL O'CoNNoR. supra
note 31, at 131, 142. Bierce also had no respect for the work of Jack London and Upton Sinclair.
V. NEALE, supra note 31, at 299, 307.
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disgruntled readers." However, the incident that apparently had the
greatest impact on Bierce was one involving a rival newspaperman, M,
H. (Michael Harry) De Young of the San Francisco Chronicle.4"
Between 1881 and 1884, when Bierce was still editor of the Wasp,
the Chronicle virtually waged war against the wealthy Spreckles family
of San Francisco, attacking its business dealings on 120 different occa-
sions. Although the elderly Claus SIpreckles had once attacked De
Young with his cane, De Young refused to stop his printed assaults. 46
On November 11, 1884, the paper accused Claus Spreckles of de-
frauding his fellow stockholders of the Hawaiian Commercial and
Sugar Company of more than one million dollars. The following day, it
further declared that the conduct of Claus and the company's board of
directors justified criminal prosecution. On November 20th, Adolph
Spreckles, the son of Claus, confronted editor De Young of the Chroni-
cle and shot him twice. Spreckles was in turn shot by George Emerson,
an assistant bookkeeper in the employ of the Chronicle.
In December, all charges against Emerson were dismissed, and on
January 31, 1885, Adolph Spreckles was tried on charges of assault
with intent to commit murder. This was not the first such incident in-
volving the De Young family. Delos Lake, a prominent San Francisco
lawyer, had earlier been convicted of shooting at De Young and fined
$300, and De Young's brother, Charles, himself an editor, had been
shot and killed by the son of Isaac Kalloch, a Baptist minister and a
Workingman's Party candidate who successfully ran for mayor of San
Francisco. 47 The shooting had been in retaliation for the earlier wound-
ing of Kalloch by Charles De Young, which had occurred during an
argument between Charles and Kalloch, who objected to being the tar-
get of the De Youngs' printed invective. The incidents involving the De
Youngs suggested that some San Franciscans had declared open season
on newspaper editors.
There was in fact no love lost between Bierce and Michael De
Young. They had been at odds with each other for years; Bierce had
called De Young a murderer to his face, and branded him in print as
"a liar, a scoundrel and, perhaps, a coward. 48 Bierce's poem "A Lifted
44. K. STARR, supra note 12, at 271.
45. The story of the Spreckles episode is told in D. MUSCATINE, OLD SAN FRANCISCO: TilE
BIOGRAPHY OF A CITY FROM EARLY DAYS TO THE EARTHQUAKE 163, 359 (1975).
46. C. MCWILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 167.
47. K. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 18; D. MUSCATINE, supra note 45, at 163.
48. C. MCWILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 167; R. O'CONNOR, supra note 31. at 74.
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Finger," described by one of his associates as a "terrible blast of metri-
cal invective,"49 had been written about De Young, as had his vignette
"The Controversialist."50 Nevertheless, Bierce could hardly have ap-
proved of the violent response of the Spreckles family.
For his defense, Adolph Spreckles employed Hall McAllister
(1826-1888), probably the most prominent lawyer in California at that
time."1 McAllister had arrived in San Francisco in 1849 at age twenty-
three, a graduate of Yale and a recently admitted member of the Geor-
gia bar. Over the next four decades, he tried and won more cases than
any other California lawyer, and he was reputed to have collected "the
largest fees then on record." 52 Spreckles was not disappointed by his
choice of McAllister. As a result of his lawyer's "melodious and per-
suasive eloquence" (the words are those of the prosecutor), Spreckles
was acquitted of all charges.5 3 Bierce was undoubtedly outraged by the
result of the trial and the potential threat posed to other journalists by
the jury's acquittal of Spreckles. It was apparently this incident, com-
bined with other such successes by the "sanctimonious" McAllister,
that provided the inspiration for Bierce's satirical poem "To an Insolent
Attorney.""
A second episode that colored Bierce's views of the legal system
was his involvement with an ill-fated gold mining scheme in the
Dakotas.5 5 In the spring of 1880, Bierce was appointed the general
agent of the struggling Black Hills Placer Mining Company in Dead-
wood, Dakota Territory. Despite his relocation to the Deadwood area
and his conscientious efforts to straighten out its financial affairs, the
company collapsed. Not only did Bierce fail to profit from his involve-
49. A. DECASTRO, supra note 31, at 74.
50. 5 A. BIERCE. supra note 20, at 105-06. "Bartlett of the Bulletin" the subject or The
Controversialist, was a thinly disguised version of De Young of the Chronicle. P FAToUT. THE
DEviL's LEXICOGRAPHER, supra note 31, at 146.
51. For biographical information on McAllister, see HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF
CALIFORNIA 417-21 (0. Shuck ed. 1901); HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF CALIFORNIA 186
(. Bates ed. 1912). McAllister's prominence is evidenced by Shuck's volume, hich contains a
photograph of McAllister opposite the title page. A section entitled "Men of the First Era" begins
with a biographical sketch of McAllister followed by one of the then recently deceased United
States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field. After his death, the San Francisco Bar Association
erected a larger than life bronze statue of McAllister in Golden Gate Park. K JoNSso.,. supra
note 23, at 5.
52. D. MUSCATINE, supra note 45, at 359. McAllister and his wvife were also the reigning king
and queen of San Francisco's high society during the years following the Civil War. Id.
53. Id.
54. See text accompanying supra notes 20-23.
55. The full story of this undertaking is told in P. FATouT. THE BLACK HILLS. supra note 31.
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ment, but he also ended up as the nominal plaintiff in a lawsuit against
the First National Bank of Deadwood. This lawsuit dragged on for nine
years, and while Bierce had assigned his claim to the proceeds of any
recovery, he was unable to withdraw from the litigation. Moreover, he
was forced to give lengthy depositions about matters he preferred to
forget, and ultimately had to pay court costs, even though he techni-
cally prevailed in the action. In the course of the litigation, Bierce
came to despise Daniel McLaughlin and William R. Steele, the lawyers
retained by his former employer. Because it was McLaughlin and
Steele who had taken the assignment of the claim in lieu of previously
unpaid fees, they had no interest in ending the litigation as long as
there was any possibility of recovery.
In 1885, after four years of unsuccessful litigation, Bierce ap-
pealed to his friend Judge John H. Boalt for assistance in withdrawing
from the lawsuit. To Bierce's dismay, Boalt assured him that even
though he had assigned his claim to his lawyers and had been only a
nominal plaintiff to begin with, he was powerless to withdraw and
would be liable for court costs. Bierce certainly derived little consola-
tion from Judge Boalt's further observation, "Your letters and evidence
are so exceptionally clear and intelligent as to excite every lawyer's im-
agination. . . .The fact is my dear Bierce, you are a natural lawyer
yourself and would have been an ornament to the profession." ' 6
The lawsuit was finally resolved in April 1889. McLaughlin and
Steele collected their fees, and Bierce was forced to pay $213 in court
costs.5 7 While Bierce's hostility to lawyers predated his involvement in
these matters, this experience did nothing to change his outlook. With
some justification, it allowed him to view himself as a victim of an idi-
otic system in which only the financial interests of the lawyers really
mattered.
V. THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN BIERCE'S CALIFORNIA
Bierce's highly critical view of the legal institutions of his day was
not simply the product of his own unfortunate experiences. It was also
a public-minded reaction to the variety of factors that gave the Califor-
nia legal system its distinctive character and created an aura of arbi-
trariness around its operation. The California legal system was filled
56. Id. at 150.
57. Other litigation stemming from the failure of the Black Hills Placer Mining Company
continued, ultimately reaching the United States Supreme Court. See Suessenbach v. First Na-
tional Bank of Deadwood, 149 U.S. 787 (1892).
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with irrationality and contradictions; the state's courts were inefficient
and obsessed with technicalities; the quality of the judiciary was low;
and many California lawyers possessed few qualifications for what was
supposedly a learned profession.
The problems began with the incomplete conversion from a civil
law system (as had existed under Mexican rule) to a common law one.
Originally a Spanish colony and then a province of Mexico, California
had been settled primarily by Americans who declared their indepen-
dence in 1846. The area formally became part of the United States in
1848 when it was ceded (along with most of the current American
Southwest) by Mexico at the conclusion of the Mexican-American
War. Its population grew dramatically after the discovery of gold in
1849, and the following year California was admitted to the union as
the thirty-first state.
Although the California Constitution of 1851 officially adopted the
common law as the law of the state, vestiges of the civil law system
survived, most notably in the form of marital community property.
Moreover, the treaty ending the war with Mexico had guaranteed that
the United States would honor all existing property rights. Unfortu-
nately, the Mexican law of real property proved largely incompatible
with the common law system, and the existence of overlapping land
grants guaranteed constant litigation over land titles for the remainder
of the century. Few such suits could be quickly resolved; in fact, a law-
suit to quiet title to land in California lasted, on average, seventeen
years.58 In 1886, the California Supreme Court further complicated the
issue of real property rights by ruling (to the surprise of almost every-
one) that the common law doctrine of riparian rights applied in Cali-
fornia, even though the civil rule had been followed in practice for
more than three decades.5 9
A second problem and a source of great instability for the system
of justice was the state's heritage of violence and extrajudicial dispute
resolution. The skeletal legal institutions of frontier California were
simply incapable of dealing with the influx of immigrants that arrived
after discovery of gold. As in most frontier societies, violent crimes
were common, and many Californians resorted to vigilantism when the
existing legal system proved inadequate. Although the San Francisco
Committee of Vigilance is the best-known of these groups, it did not
58. L. FRIEDMAN. A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 432 (2d ed. 1985) (citing W RoBINso..
LAND IN CAUFORNIA 106 (1948)).
59. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
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lack for counterparts elsewhere in the state. In the 1850s, twenty-seven
California communities had vigilante committees.6 0 Explicit in their ac-
tions was a dissatisfaction with the existing judicial system; implicit
was a widely shared belief that the demands of "justice" sometimes
warranted the abandonment of the formal rule of law. Although the
vigilante movement had subsided by the end of the 1860s, it left a leg-
acy of self-help and of distrust of the formal legal machinery.,1
Public respect for the legal system was also undermined by the
widespread perception that the adjudicatory process was so ridden with
arcane rules and procedures that most cases were decided, not upon
their merits, but on legal technicalities. In one highly publicized case,
the California Supreme Court overturned a criminal conviction on the
grounds that the failure to identify the victim, Lee Wing, as a human
being made the indictment fatally defective.6 2 Even when the appropri-
ate result was reached, it was often only after months, or even years, of
litigation and appeals. For many lawyers, protracted litigation was not
only inevitable, but also a perfectly respectable professional tool.0 3 In
the eyes of many Californians, delay, not justice, was the dominant
feature of their legal system.
The adoption of the Field Code in 1873 was intended to streamline
legal procedures in the state, but problems persisted. The widely
spread perception that too many cases were decided on legal technicali-
ties ultimately led the California legislature to command the judiciary
to disregard errors in pleading and practice unless the complaining
party could show to the satisfaction of the state Supreme Court that he
had suffered injury by reason of such error.6 5 The statute had limited
effect, however, because it was later declared unconstitutional by the
60. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 367. One historian of San Francisco has entitled chapters
dealing with the legal history of the period 1850 to 1870, "No Law and Less Order" and "Judge
Lynch Rides High." S. LONGSTREET. THE WILDER SHORE: A GALA SOCIAL HISTORY OF SAN
FRANCISCO'S SINNERS AND SPENDERS. 1849-1906, at 69-90 (1968).
61. For a case study of a California community in this era that addresses the problem of social
order, see R. MANN. AFTER THE GOLD Rusi: SOCIETY IN GRASS VALLEY AND NEVADA CITY.
CALIFORNIA. 1849-1870 (1982).
62. People v. Lee Look, 137 Cal. 590, 70 P. 660 (1902). For an assertion that this decision
was representative of many in the final decades of the nineteenth century, see McMurray, Sev-
enty-Five Years of California Jurisprudence, 13 CAL- L. REV. 463 (1925).
63. On the use of delay as a tactic by California trial lawyers, see R. MCGRATH. GUNFIGHT-
ERS. HIGHWAYMEN. AND VIGILANTES 256 (1984).
64. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 394. The Field Code was devised by David Dudley Field
of New York, the'brother of California's Stephen Field, in 1851. Id. at 391-98. For a discussion of
the procedural problems discussed above in a national context, see id. at 398-411.
65. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 475 (Deering 1886); McMurray, supra note 62, at 463.
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California Supreme Court.66 When an effort was made to form a state
bar association in 1890, reform of the judiciary was a top priority.6 7
Similarly, for the California Progressive movement of the first decade
of the twentieth century, reform of the state's court procedures was an
important, though ultimately unsuccessful goal.68
The problem of technicalities undermining the respect for the law
was not just the result of an overly solicitous appellate judiciary. It was
also a product of a system where trial judges often lacked an adequate
understanding of legal procedures. 9 In the 1870s, the California Su-
preme Court reversed convictions in more than fifty percent of the
criminal cases brought before it. Although the percentage declined in
subsequent decades, the corresponding figure remained just under forty
percent for the rest of the century.70 The rate of reversal for murder
convictions was almost as high as that for crimes generally. In the
1870s, two out of every five convictions were overturned; by the 1890s,
the rate was still one out of four.7 1 The source of the "problem" was
almost always the failure of the lower court to follow proper proce-
dures---eighty-three percent of all reversals were for procedural
reasons.
72
The judges themselves did little to improve the situation. Although
there is no reason to think that California judges were any more cor-
rupt than judges in other states, their alleged ties to powerful economic
interests were a frequent source of complaint. Such criticisms were not
without substance. In the 1880s, for example, the judges of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held annual passes entitling them to free travel on
the Southern Pacific Railroad and were widely believed to be under the
control of that railroad.73 Bierce shared this view, reflected in his epi-
66. San Jose Ranch Co. v. San Joaquin Land & Water Co., 126 Cal. 322. 58 P. 824 (1899).
67. Lieb, Needed Reform in Our Judiciary System, in THE CAUFORNIA STATE BAR ASSOCiA-
TION. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING 29-32 (1890).
68. G. MOWRY. THE CAUFORNIA PROGRESSIVES 82 (1951).
69. McMurray, supra note 62, at 449.
70. The exact percentages of reversals were 52.4% for the 1870s, 38.3% for the 1880s. and
38.9% for the 1 890s. Vernier & Selig, The Reversal of Crinlnal Cases in the Supreme Court of
California, 20 J. Am. INST. CRIMt. L & CRIMINOLOGY 60, 63 (1929).
71. Id. at 64. The percentages were 39.7% for the 1870s and 25.4% for the 1890s.
72. Id. at 65. O(728 cases reversed between 1850 and 1900. 605 were reversed for procedural
reasons.
73. K. STARR. INVENTING THE DREAM: CAUFORNIA THROUGH THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 200
(1985). According to historian George Mowry, "As for the state judiciary, it was the considered
opinion of Dr. John R. Haynes [a California progressive] that the Southern Pacifies domination




taph for the state's most prominent judge, Justice Stephen Field of the
United States Supreme Court. Of Field, Bierce wrote:
Here sleeps one of the greatest students
Of jurisprudence
Nature endowed him with the gift
Of juristhrift
All points of law alike he threw
The dice to settle
Those honest cubes were loaded true
With railway metal.7 4
But even more than its alleged ties to the state's plutocracy, the
authority of the California judiciary was undermined by the require-
ment that judges be elected by popular vote." (This, of course, was not
unique to California; in the late nineteenth century, it was the most
common method of judicial selection.78) Forced to compete for votes,
California judges normally allied themselves with a particular political
party, which in the wide-open political battles of late nineteenth-cen-
tury California undermined a judge's ability to command the respect of
the large numbers of citizens who dissented from his chosen political
position.77 Although it did little to change the situation, the state con-
stitutional convention of 1878 was reportedly motivated in part by a
general distrust of the state judiciary. 8
The career of California Supreme Court Chief Justice David S.
Terry illustrates many of the features that served to undermine respect
for the legal system. Terry joined the state's highest court as an associ-
ate justice in 1855, then the following year became involved in a dis-
pute with the San Francisco Vigilance Committee which resulted in
Terry's stabbing a member of the committee. The victim was seriously
wounded, and Terry was taken into custody by the vigilantes. Only the
recovery of his victim allowed Terry to escape trial and, presumably,
execution for murder. Terry felt under no obligation to resign from the
Court, and the following year he became chief justice. He did resign in
1859, so that he could challenge United States Senator David C. Brod-
74. 4 A. BiERCE. supra note 16, at 349.
75. McMurray, supra note 62, at 449-50.
76. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 371-73.
77. See McMurray, supra note 62, at 448-50. The point here is not to argue that all these
features were unique to California; they were in fact present in different degrees in all American
jurisdictions.
78. K. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 9.
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erick to a duel. The duel took place, and Broderick was killed.79
After the outbreak of the Civil War, Terry left California to fight
for the Confederacy. When the war ended, he migrated to Mexico, only
to return within a year to California. (His arrival coincided with
Bierce's.) He resumed his law practice, appearing frequently before the
highest state and federal courts. In 1878-1879, he played a prominent
part in the California Constitutional Convention.8
In 1886, Terry married, and took up the cause of, the controversial
Sarah Hill who for several years had been immersed in litigation in-
volving the issue of whether she had been legally married to William
Sharon, a wealthy California mine owner and banker who was also a
United States Senator from Nevada. (In 1885, Bierce had written of
Mr. Sharon: "Served in the Senate, for our sins, his time / Each word
a folly and each vote a crime." ' ) After being rejected by Sharon, with
whom she had been romantically involved, Hill had made public vari-
ous letters purporting to demonstrate that she and Sharon had been
secretly married. She then filed for a divorce claiming her share of the
marital property. A state court recognized the validity of the alleged
marriage and awarded her a divorce, but a federal court, basing its
jurisdiction on the diversity of citizenship of the parties-although
Sharon spent most of his time in California, he was a Senator from
Nevada-ruled that no marriage had existed. In the midst of litigation,
Sharon died, but Hill continued to pursue her claim.
The new Mr. and Mrs. Terry eventually developed a particular
animus for Terry's former California Supreme Court colleague, Ste-
phen Field, then a justice of the United States Supreme Court, whose
circuit-riding duties regularly brought him back to California. Al-
though Field was not the judge who originally ruled against Hill, he
did hand down a ruling in 1888 upholding the previous federal court
finding that no valid marriage had ever existed. Because of a technical-
ity, Mrs. Terry's appeal of the earlier federal court decision proved to
be defective, and Field's ruling left her without further legal recourse.
It also resulted in an outburst in the courtroom that featured Mrs.
Terry openly accusing Field of taking bribes from Sharon's relatives
and Mr. Terry knocking a tooth out of the mouth of a federal marshal.
79. For a biographical sketch of Terry, see C. SWISHER. STEPHEN J. FIEu, CRAFTSMAN OF
THE LAW 74-75, 321-61 (1969).
80. Id. at 328-29.
81. P. FATouT. THE DEvIL's LEXICOGRAPHER, supra note 31, at 146 (quoting Wasp, Jan. 3.
1885). See supra text accompanying note 33.
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In response, Field sentenced both to jail terms of three and six months,
respectively, for contempt of court.
After his release from jail, Terry made a number of public threats
against Field. When the two accidentally confronted each other in Au-
gust 1889 in the dining room at the Lathrop, California train station,
Terry struck Field on the head from behind with his hand. In response,
Field's bodyguard rose to his feet, drew his pistol, and killed the appar-
ently unarmed Terry. Sarah Terry swore out a complaint charging both
men with the murder of her husband, and the following day a justice of
the peace in Terry's home town of Stockton issued arrest warrants for
Field and his bodyguard. Field was formally arrested, but was released
immediately by a writ of habeas corpus obtained from the United
States Circuit Court of California of which he was the senior member.
While there was no serious effort to prosecute Field, the issue of
whether his bodyguard could be tried by a California state court in the
face of a federal writ of habeas corpus ordering his release ultimately
reached the United States Supreme Court.82 While Terry's career was
clearly a colorful one, it was not one likely to increase the public's re-
spect for the legal system.
For all the controversy that surrounded his career, Terry was one
of the state's most prominent attorneys. The typical California lawyer
of the Gilded Age was much less successful and probably even less
well-respected. In this regard, the bar reflected the wide-open nature of
California generally. In an era when bar admission standards were
minimal everywhere and the number of lawyers was steadily increas-
ing, California stood near the front of American jurisdictions in terms
of the ease of bar admission and ahead of all jurisdictions in the num-
ber of lawyers per capita.
The most remarkable feature of the California bar was its sheer
size, at least compared to the state's total population." Nowhere in the
82. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). The power of the federal court to issue the writ was
upheld by a 6-2 vote, with Justice Field abstaining.
83. The 1850 United States Census recorded 191 lawyers in the state, one for every 485 resi-
dents (1:485). By 1860, the number had increased to 894 and the ratio to 1:425; by 1870, to 1,1 15
and 1:502; by 1880 to 1,899 and 1:455; by 1890 to 3,228 and 1:376; and by 1900, to 4,278 and
1:355. Between 1870 and 1900, roughly the period of Bierce's residency, the population of Califor-
nia increased by 165%, but the number of lawyers nearly quadrupled. The population figures for
this and following paragraphs were calculated by the author based on statistics taken from the
published reports of the United States Census for the period 1850 to 1900. In chronological order,
the census reports, from which these figures were derived are: THE SEVENTH CENSUS OF TIlE
UNITED STATES: 1850. AN APPENDIX 976 (1853); POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1860,
at 523-24 (1864); NINTH CENSUS: THE STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES
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United States was there a greater concentration of lawyers. Bierce
maintained that the pioneer had been followed to California, not by
law and order, but by the harlot and the "jack-leg lawyer."8'  Whether
or not this was true, nineteenth-century California did attract an ex-
traordinary number of lawyers.85 Between 1870 and 1900, the greatest
concentration of lawyers in the state was in the San Francisco Bay
area.
8 6
722, 799 (1872); STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AT TIlE TE-NTH CENSUS
733, 760, 811, 902 (1883); REPORT ON POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE ELEVENTH
CENSUS, 1890, pt. 2, at 536-37, 728-29 (1897); SPECIAL REPORTS. OCCUPATIONS AT THE
TWELFTH CENSUS 230-35, 720-25 (1904).
84. S. LONGSTREET, supra note 60, at 44. The full quotation, delivered at the bar of San
Francisco's Palace Hotel is: "Following the pioneer came not law and order but first the harlot.
then the jack-leg lawyers, and corruption of governing bodies by the boodle grabbers." The source
of this quote is the daybook of "R.J.," a socially active wine merchant in San Francisco from 1859
to 1910 who was a distant relative of the author Longstreet's mother. His name is withheld. Id. at
xiv.
85. The sheer size of the California bar, relative to its population, can be seen in the following
table comparing the size of the California bar in 1890 with the American bar as a whole and the
bars of twelve selected states.
STATE POP. 1890 LAWYERS RATIO
California 1,213,398 3,228 376:1
New York 6,003,174 11,194 536:1
Texas 2,234,527 3,555 629:1
Indiana 2,192,404 3,208 683:1
Iowa 1,912,297 2,800 683:1
Pennsylvania 5,258,113 6,735 781:1
West Virginia 762,794 937 814:1
Massachusetts 2,238,947 2,589 865:1
Virginia - 1,655,980 1,650 1004:1
Alabama 1,513,401 1,313 1153:1
South Carolina 1,151,149 772 1491:1
UNITED STATES 62,947,714 89,630 702:1
The per capita ratio of lawyers was higher in California than the other examined states in
every census year from 1850 to 1890.
1850 1860 1870
California 497:1 466:1 502:1
Texas 485:1 425:1 797:1
Between 1850 and 1860, the ratio for Texas was only slightly lower than for California.
However, by 1870, Texas had fallen behind, 1:797 to 1:502. After 1870 none of the examined
states ever approached the figure for California. See sources cited supra note 83.
86. The San Francisco bar grew from 433 lawyers in 1870, to 661 in 1880, to 843 in 1890,
and to 1202 in 1900. The manuscript census returns for 1880 also record another 171 lawyers in
nearby Oakland and Alameda County for a total of 832 lawyers in the Bay area, a number repre-
senting 43.8% of the lawyers in the state. See sources cited supra note 83. For the number of
lawyers in Oakland and Alameda County, see L FRIEDMAN & R. PERCIVAL. TilE ROOTS OF Jus-
TICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY. CALIFORNIA. 1870-1910. at 57 (1981).
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As a body, the California bar of the late nineteenth century was
composed primarily of white California-born males. Foreign-born attor-
neys accounted for only 10.4% of all lawyers in 1870, and while their
percentage rose to 14.0% in 1880, it subsequently declined to 12.3 % in
1890 and then to 10.8. % in 1900.87 In contrast to the state as a whole,
the number of foreign-born attorneys in San Francisco increased
sharply between 1880 and 1890, rising from 8.1 % of the total to
17.8% before declining to 14.1 % in 1900.8 The number of women and
racial minorities in the legal profession was minimal. Prior to 1878,
admission to the bar had been restricted to white males, 89 but after the
limitation was repealed by the California legislature only a handful of
individuals from the excluded groups entered the profession.90 In 1890,
the California bar included eleven women, five blacks, and no orientals.
By 1900, these numbers had 'risen only slightly, to 60, 6, and 4
respectively."1
The minimal standards for admission to the California bar helped
facilitate its rapid growth. In the second half of the nineteenth century,
there were no formal educational prerequisites for bar admission and
no minimum period of law study. The only requirements were that the
applicant be twenty-one years old, of good moral character (which was
to be established by "satisfactory testimonials" produced by the appli-
cant), and possess the "necessary qualifications of learning and abil-
ity."'92 Applicants seeking admission to the bar had several alternatives.
Those who sought to be admitted to practice before all courts in the
state, including the state supreme court, were examined orally in open
court by the justices of the supreme court on the opening day of each
of the court's six annual sessions. The statute provided that the appli-
cant was to "undergo a strict examination," but there is little evidence
that the justices used the oral examination to exclude any marginally
87. See sources cited supra note 83.
88. Id.
89. CAL Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 275-76, 279 (Haymond 1872).
90. Act of April 1, 1878, reprinted in AcTs AMENDATORY TO THE CODES OF CALIFORNIA
1877-1878, at 99 (1878). Sections 275 and 279 were amended to permit non-white males and
women to practice law. CAL CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 275, 279 (Deering 1886). If the caricature that
appeared in the February 19, 1881 issue of the Wasp expresses the sentiments of the paper's
editor (Bierce), then Bierce thought very little of the idea of women lawyers. The drawing por-
trays Clara Shortridge Foltz and Mary McHenry, two of the early women lawyers in California,
clad as dance hall girls performing on stage before judge and jury. The drawing is reprinted in K.
JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 13.
91. See sources cited supra note 83.
92. See sources cited supra note 90.
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competent candidate. Because of the limited time available, examina-
tions tended to be brief; often a single question sufficed. °3 An 1881 sur-
vey of bar admission standards in the United States reported that the
examination in California was "said to be confined to the most elemen-
tary subjects." '94
Those who .sought to avoid the examination by the supreme court
could instead present themselves to the district or county court in
which they desired to practice. There the local judge would administer
an examination similar to that required for admission by the supreme
court.95 The only disadvantage to this method of admission was that
each time a lawyer desired to practice in a new district, he had to sub-
mit to an additional examination. For practice in the state's lowest
courts-the justice courts-no examination was required at all, so long
as the individual seeking to represent a party obtained a valid power of
attorney.96
It was also possible to secure admission to the bar without any
examination. Lawyers licensed in other jurisdictions were automatically
admitted to practice upon a showing of their license and "satisfactory
evidence of good moral character."97 After 1878, graduates of Has-
tings, the law school of the University of California, were also admitted
without examination, a practice referred to as the "diploma privi-
lege."98 Admission without examination was so common that between
1905 and 1910, only 335 of the 1036 lawyers admitted to practice by
the District Court of Appeals for the Second District were actually ex-
amined. The rest were admitted either by producing a license from an-
93. REPORT OF THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
25 (1901). For a discussion of the bar admission procedure in California at this time, see L
FRIEDMAN & R. PERCIVAL, supra note 86, at 58-59; Stevens, Diploma Privilege. Bar Examina-
tion or Open Admission, 46 THE BAR EXAMINER 15 app. at 72-73 (1977).
94. F. Wellman, Admission to the Bar, 15 AM. L REv. 295, 302 (1881).
95. CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 277 (Haymond 1872). The 1886 Code preserved this alternative,
subject to the requirement of "strict examination in open court, and not otherwise." CAL Civ.
PROC. CODE § 276 (Deering 1886).
96. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 96 (Deering 1886).
97. CAL CIv. PROc. CODE § 279 (Haymond 1872); CAL CiV. PROC. CODE § 279 (Deering
1886). The statute did reserve the right of the court to examine an applicant as to his qualifica-
tions, but this option was rarely exercised. Stevens, Admission and Disbarment of Attorneys at
Law, in CALIFORNIA BAR ASSOCIATION. PROCEEDINGS OF FIRST ANNUAL CONVENTION 21, 33
(1910).
98. 1877-1878 Cal. Stat. 533-34. The act also provided that the diploma privilege was subject
to the right of the Chief Justice of the State to order an examination, as in ordinary cases of
applicants without the diploma.
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other state or by the diploma privilege. 9
The ease with which one could be admitted to the bar was rooted
in widespread belief in nineteenth-century America that law should be
an egalitarian profession. 100 If nothing else, this attitude guaranteed
that many lawyers would begin their careers with only minimal prepa-
ration. While in some parts of the United States informal pressure may
have discouraged marginally prepared individuals from entering the
ranks of the bar, no such pressure existed in California. Although the
following evaluation of the state of legal training in 1881 was written
by a Nebraska lawyer, it applied with equal force to California.
There is great difficulty in compelling adequate prepara-
tion for admission to the bar in the western states. The pres-
sure of young men is excessive. The profession here is full of
men without considerable general culture. They cannot, there-
fore, well appreciate it, nor are they naturally disposed to re-
quire it of others. Those of them who, by force of their own
character and labor, have to a degree supplied the deficiencies
of early training and duly value the advantages of adequate
preparation for the bar, are vastly outnumbered by those who
have not attained to the elevation of a due estimate of those
advantages. 01
The legal profession was as egalitarian in its formal organization
as it was in its admissions policy. There was no state bar association to
set standards for professional conduct, and while there were a few local
associations, like the San Francisco Bar Association organized in 1872,
they were usually elitist organizations with little interest in opening
their membership to the bar as a whole.' 02 Needless to say, there was
99. Stevens, supra note 97, at 33.
100. For a summary of attitudes toward the process of bar admission in the nineteenth cen-
tury, see J. Hylton, The Virginia Lawyer from Reconstruction to the Great Depression 62-93
(1986) (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University).
101. Appendix to the Report of the Committee on Legal Education and Admission to the
Bar, 4 REP. A.B.A. 237, 300 (1881) (quoting James M. Woolworth).
102. L. FRIEDMAN & R. PERCIVAL, supra note 86, at 62. The early San Francisco Bar Associ-
ation has been described by its historian as a "rather exclusive men's social club" that counted no
more than a quarter of the city's lawyers among its members. K. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 20.
Efforts to form a state-wide association failed in 1889 and 1901, before succeeding in 1909. Id.
For the results of these efforts, see CALIFORNIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION. PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIRST ANNUAL MEETING (1890); CALIFORNIA BAR ASSOCIATION. CONSTITUTION. BYLAWS AND
PROCEEDINGS (1909); CALIFORNIA BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL CON-
VENTION (1910); REPORT OF THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THlE CALIFORNIA STATE BAR Asso-
CIATION (1910).
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no official code of ethics governing professional behavior. The modem
day law "firm" also did not exist in California. Partnerships of more
than two lawyers were very uncommon and the typical attorney prac-
ticed on his own. 03
One consequence of the mushrooming number of lawyers was an
intense competition for legal business. While a few lawyers, particu-
larly those who could attract corporations as clients, accumulated sub-
stantial fortunes, a far larger number had a very difficult time surviving
economically. Lawrence Friedman and Robert Percival, describing the
competitiveness of law practice in late nineteenth-century California,
have written:
[F]or many lawyers, professional life was a rat race, with very
little cheese at the end. It was easy to get into the profession,
but hard to get rich, and easy to drop out. Some men barely
hung on; they had to scramble for work on the margin of le-
gality and even lower in public esteem.'1°
Many lawyers were little more than collection agents, while others were
forced to solicit clients wherever they could find them, an activity that
often earned them the contempt of the public. The city police courts
were one such place. Struggling lawyers, waiting around the court to
buttonhole clients, were a familiar sight to the journalists of Bierce's
San Francisco.10 5 Another source of clients was the San Francisco wa-
terfront. As one San Francisco historian has written:
A contingent of barhopping lawyers snared unhappy crewman
whom they convinced to bring suits against shipowners respon-
sible for the harsh treatment they had received. When the
court awarded a judgment in a sailor's favor, his attorney
pocketed the cash, which always managed to coincide exactly
with the amount of his fee.100
While there is little hard data on the income of lawyers in this
period, there is evidence that the number of economically marginal
lawyers was significant. The 1890 United States Census recorded that
2.1 % of California lawyers were unemployed during the previous year,
103. L. FRIEDMAN & R. PERCIVAL, supra note 86. at 61-62. FOr a listing of individual lawyers
and law partnerships in California, see the AMERICAN LAW DIRECTORY (1890).
104. L. FRIEDMAN & R. PERCIVAL, supra note 86, at 61.
105. Id. at 62.
106. D. MUSCATINE, supra note 45, at 203.
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and in 1900 the number was 2.7% .107 While these percentages are
small, they suggest a problem of much greater dimensions. Because vir-
tually all lawyers were self-employed, to be "unemployed" would be to
have given up on the possibility of attracting clients. For every "unem-
ployed" lawyer, there were no doubt dozens of "underemployed" ones.
Moreover, there was a growing perception on the part of the bar itself
that the state's egalitarian system of bar admissions had created a seri-
ous problem of overcrowding in the profession.10 8
Finally, the highly publicized financial success of many California
lawyers was derived from sources other than the practice of law. For
example, William Sharon, the alleged first husband of Sarah Hill, was
a native of Carrollton, Illinois who had studied law with Edward Stan-
ton, Lincoln's Secretary of War. During his first twelve years in San
Francisco he amassed a fortune of $250,000 as a merchant and real
estate entrepreneur, but he never practiced law.109 Leland Stanford had
been admitted to the bar in New York in 1848, but when he came to
California in 1852, he first entered the grocery business. Although he
was worth more than $10 million dollars by 1871, his legal career was
limited to a short stint as justice of the peace.110
VI. AMBROSE BIERCE AS SOCIAL CRITIC
Viewed in light of contemporary circumstances, the motivation be-
hind Bierce's criticism of law and lawyers becomes far more apparent.
Although his short imaginative pieces and stories have proved to be
more memorable, Bierce devoted considerable attention to legal mat-
ters in his editorial writing. Rather than merely lampoon, Bierce was
willing to enter the political fray and offer substantive corrections to
the abuses he denounced.
An unfortunate side effect of the focus on Bierce's imaginative
writing has been the scant attention that critics and historians have
107. See sources cited supra note 83. The national figure was 1.8%.
108. CALIFORNIA BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS 208, 256-58 (1918).
109. D. MUSCATINE, supra note 45, at 297-98.
110. Id. at 331, 362. For a series of biographical profiles of leading California lawyers of the
late nineteenth century, see HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF CALIFORNIA (0. Shuck cd.
1901); HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF CALIFORNIA (J. Bates ed. 1912). Financial opportu-
nities to be derived solely from a law practice were limited. On the practice of law in nineteenth
century California, see generally G. BAKKEN. PRACTICING LAW IN FRONTIER CALIFORNIA (1991);
C. FRITZ, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA. THE COURT OF OGDEN HOFFMAN, 1851-1891 (1991);
C. ROGERS, A COUNTY JUDGE IN ARCADY: SELECTED PRIVATE PAPERS OF CHARLES FERNALD
(1954).
[Vol. 23:705
AMBROSE BIERCE AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
paid to the full range of his writings, despite their acknowledgment
that the bulk of his work was done as a journalist and social critic. The
few critics who have studied his journalistic and critical work have not
always given him sufficient credit for his insights. In discussing Bierce's
commentary on public events, Edmund Wilson observed that "[h]e
seems interested in denouncing political corruption mainly from the
point of view of its giving him an opportunity to imagine macabre
scenes in which the miscreants are received in Hell or left to survive
alone in a universe divested of life." '
This, however, is not quite fair to Bierce. Bierce's essays on social
issues convey an impression of himself which is different from his con-
ventional image. "Bitter Bierce," the scoffer and scorner, is of course
still there, but his concerns are far more practical and immediate.
What one finds in these essays is not the misanthropic figure outside
the American mainstream cultivating his eccentric tastes for the bi-
zarre, but rather a perceptive critic of the excesses and abuses of the
Gilded Age. Although he often delighted in pointing out the shortcom-
ings of his contemporaries, and his cynicism led him time after time to
reject all reform movements as misguided, his essays and journalistic
writings reveal that his vision of humanity did, to a certain degree,
transcend the alienation and disaffiliation that are associated with his
more purely literary efforts.
Bierce's views on the American legal system appear most highly
developed in the essay "Some Features of the Law," which first ap-
peared in book form in 1909 in his The Shadow on the Dial and Other
Essays."" In more than thirty pages, Bierce sets down his objections to
the contemporary state of legal affairs. The style is sarcastic, but the
purpose of the essay is clearly not to parody but to convince. While no
one would ever mistake "Some Features of the Law" for Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes Jr.'s The Common Law, it does reflect an awareness of the
historical dimension of Anglo-American law and of the actual day-to-
day operations of the courtroom and the law office. Divided into eleven
sections, "Some Features of the Law" marches through Bierce's own
bill of particulars against the legal system.
The essay begins by questioning the "incomputable additions"
I 11. E. WILSON, supra note 38, at 624.
112. 11 A. BIERCE, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF AM ROSE BIERCE. ANTEPENULTIA.IATA 99-129
(1912). "Some Features of the Law" was probably compiled from earlier neuspap-er writings. On
Bierce's journalistic efforts, see Berkove, The Man with the Burning Pen: Ambrose Blerce as
Journalist, 15 J. POPULAR CULTURE 34-40 (1981).
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made to the law by lawyers and judges. For Bierce, "law" properly
meant statutes (which, he insisted, were bad enough). What he ob-
jected to was the body of additional "law" created by judicial interpre-
tations of existing statutes. Once on the books this "body of super-
ingenious writings" could be used as authority for setting aside any
statute (i.e., legitimate law) with which the judge hearing a case might
disagree. Although this objection was probably inspired by the actions
of the California Supreme Court in the 1880s and 1890s, it hardly
originated with Bierce. The antidemocratic implications of the law-
making power of American judges had been under attack since the
days of the early Republic and was behind the recurrent codification
movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.113 While far from
a crusading democrat, Bierce disliked the arbitrary exercise of power,
and he seized upon judges as a particularly attractive target. However,
the blame for the situation as Bierce saw it did not rest entirely with
judges and lawyers. Indeed, he wrote, "They only create and thrust it
down our throats; we are guilty of contributory negligence in not biting
the spoon.'"114
Criminal procedure was a topic that interested Bierce a great deal.
Although the United States Supreme Court had ruled in Hurtado v.
California115 (a case arising out of a murder in Bierce's San Francisco)
that the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights of the United
States Constitution did not apply to cases in state courts, the California
courts were receptive to certain types of civil liberties claims by crimi-
nal defendants, particularly from those whose convictions involved pro-
cedural irregularities (hence, the high incidence of reversals). On the
other hand, they tolerated other types of infringements of the rights of
the accused. Bierce's criticisms of the existing practices seem to have
been motivated, as one might suspect, more by his disapproval of the
illogic of the system, than by a concern for the defendant. Nonetheless,
his criticisms do illustrate an awareness of the unfairness of the ex-
isting system that escaped many of his contemporaries.
In successive parts of the essay he attacked numerous features of
the criminal trial. Among these were the practice of sentencing con-
victed criminals before they had exhausted all rights to appeal; the use
of the preliminary hearing before trial to attack the credibility of wit-
nesses; the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination (which
113. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 403-07.
114. 11 A. BIERCE, supra note 112, at 100.
115. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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Bierce thought was a bad idea); the admissibility of evidence of past
moral indiscretion for the purpose of discrediting a witness's testimony;
and the unregulated power of judges to imprison participants in a trial
for contempt of court.
Bierce also used this essay as a forum to voice his disenchantment
with the legal profession. Although he professed to have no remedy, he
characterized the entire court system as being "perpetuated, altered
and improved" for the financial benefit of lawyers. As he put it:
The laws are mostly made by lawyers, and so made as to en-
courage and compel litigation. By lawyers they are interpreted
and by lawyers enforced for their own profit and advantage.
The over-intricate and interminable machinery of precedent,
overrulings, writs of error, motions for new trials, appeals, re-
versals, affirmations and the rest of it, is mostly a transparent
and iniquitous system of exaction. . . The lawyers have us
and mean to keep us.""'
And, because of their ability to manipulate language toward their own
ends, lawyers were able, according to Bierce, to place themselves effec-
tively beyond the control of legislative enactment. If the bar was to be
taken to task, Bierce suggested, it would only be through the force of
public pressure.
Bierce did think that some of these excesses could be controlled. In
the defense of accused criminals, he argued, attorneys ought not to be
allowed to take cases unless they were convinced of their client's inno-
cence. In his mind, the advantages to the cause of justice would be
substantial. He was vague on how such a prohibition would be en-
forced, but he seemed to think that it could be accomplished by permit-
ting the cross-examination of attorneys in the presence of a jury with
the view of testing their credibility. Such a procedure would, Bierce
thought, both insure an ethical elevation of the legal profession and
lead to the conviction of a higher percentage of the guilty. Here again,
Bierce's actual concern for the accused offender was minimal. In his
words, "Justice itself may be promoted by acts essentially unjust."111
In the final five sections of the essay he offered a number of spe-
cific proposals for legal reforms. In regard to the divorce laws of the
day, he called attention to the common feature under which the unsuc-
cessful respondent in a divorce proceeding was forbidden to remarry
116. 11 A. BIERCE, supra note 112, at 101.
117. Id. at 111.
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during the life of the successful complainant, while the latter was sub-
jected to no such disability. Bierce denounced this as unreasonable and
"unrighteous." In typically Victorian fashion he assumed that the un-
successful party would always be the husband, and he ominously cited
the "distinct interest" in his ex-wife's death given the husband by these
statutes as a factor strongly supportive of their repeal. (Bierce's own
marriage ended in divorce.)
He also opposed the contemporary proposals that "modern" penal
codes ought to reflect a recognition of gender through the imposition of
less severe sentences for female offenders. This, Bierce thought, was
ludicrous. With even greater fervor he returned to a familiar theme in
his imaginative writing-the control of the living by the dead. Perhaps
the strongest objection Bierce had toward the legal practices of the day
was the law's willingness to give force to provisions in wills disinherit-
ing any legatee who attempted to contest the will. To do so only perpet-
uated injustice, he argued, and in the process only benefited those tes-
tators who actually were "daft, or subjected to interested suasion, or
wantonly sinful.""' 8
Criticism of the reverence of Anglo-American law *for the last will
and testament of the deceased (regardless of the circumstances under
which it was executed) was frequently voiced in Bierce's day, as in our
own. 1 9 Few, however, have ever stated their objections as forcefully
and as eloquently as Bierce when he wrote, "The dead have too much
to say in this world, at the best, and it is tyranny for them to stand at
the door of the temple of justice to drive away the suitors that them-
selves have made.' 20 The control of the living by the dead may have
been an inevitability in Bierce's fiction, but it was not something that
Bierce the social critic could tolerate.
Bierce also argued against the evidentiary rule that prohibited
hearsay testimony; called for the press to exercise greater scrutiny of
the "corrupt practices in our courts of Law"; and advocated the ap-
pointment, rather than the election, of judges, arguing that such a
change would markedly reduce the amount of corruption in the judicial
system. In sum, "Features of the Law" treats a wide range of legal
topics from the perspective of the intelligent layman who has no pa-
tience with the unfairness and delay that in his mind characterized the
legal institutions of his day.
118. Id. at 122.
119. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 422-27.
120. 11 A. BIERCE, supra note 112, at 122.
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Bierce was not alone in his critique of the legal system of Califor-
nia of his day. One can find a similar portrayal in the works of contem-
porary writers as varied as Gertrude Atherton and Bret Harte.121
Moreover, many of Bierce's concerns were ultimately embraced by
large numbers of lawyers who began to question the continued viability
of an essentially unregulated profession.
Although "reform" of the legal profession occurred more slowly in
California than in other parts of the United States, the California bar
ultimately took on a distinctly different organizational character in the
first two decades of the twentieth century. A statewide bar association
was organized, the oral examination for admission to the bar was re-
placed by a written one, and the responsibility for the exam was trans-
ferred to a board of bar examiners.122 The state also streamlined its
judicial proceedings and did away with the popular election of judges.
Whether such changes altered the nature of lawyers themselves is an
open question.
While Bierce's role in these changes, all of which came after he
left California, is impossible to calculate, his persistent criticisms of the
previous system definitely contributed to the movement for reform. On
occasion, the rhetoric of reform-minded lawyers had a Bierceian ring,
as in 1900, when the Committee on Legal Education of the California
State Bar Association pronounced:
This seems a reasonable condition [a proposed prerequisite of
a high school education for bar admission] if the law is to jus-
tify its position as a learned profession, and we are not to
countenance the idea, so common in America, that it is the
birth right of every American citizen to address a jury, and to
jeopardize the interests of those unsuspecting persons, who, for
once at least, are willing to entrust their interests or welfare to
the ignorant and the unscrupulous.123
121. G. ATHERTON. THE CALIFORNIANS (1898) (focusing on the corrupting power of money
on, among other, the aristocratic lawyer, Colonel Jack Belmont). On Atherton, see K STARR.
AMERICANS AND THE CALIFORNIA DREAM. 1850-1915. at 345-64 (1985). For an example of
Harte's depiction of California lawyers, see Harte, Colonel Starbottlefor the Plaintiff, in I THE
WORLD OF LAW 555 (E. London ed. 1960) (illustrating the irregular procedures of a legal system
not far removed from the frontier).
122. For the changes made in the organization and structure of the California bar in the early
decades of the twentieth century, see C. Gelb, Self-Regulating Professions and the Public Wel-
fare: A Case Study of the California State Bar (1957) (Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University).





Read in light of the conditions that characterized the California
legal system of his day, Bierce's writings on law take on a concreteness
that is lacking when they are considered out of their historical context.
Because anti-lawyer sentiment is a constant strand of American dis-
course, the temptation is to ignore the specific motives behind it and to
assume that whatever the merits, the complaints are identical from one
time and place to the next. Bierce's work presents us with a reminder,
however, that the history of the bench and bar in America has been a
controversial one, that past professional norms have been quite differ-
ent from their present day counterparts, and that lay critics of the legal
profession can play an important role in the alteration of those norms.
Bierce's writings about law may not be examples of great litera-
ture, but they are valuable social documents. They serve as an index to
the nature and scope of anti-lawyer sentiment in the late nineteenth
century, and, equally important, they give us an indication of the
breadth of Bierce's intellectual concerns. Far from being only a misan-
thrope or iconoclast who could cast nothing more than a vote of dissent
to the values and aspirations of his day, Bierce was a perceptive social
analyst who was able to effectively satirize the hypocrisy of contempo-
rary social arrangements and, beyond that, was prepared to suggest al-
ternatives. Order, reason, and justice-which would later be called pro-
cedural due process-were the qualities that Bierce found missing in
the law and in society generally. His own program for reform, however
tentative or cynically advanced, evidenced a pragmatic vision for which
he is rarely given credit. While Ambrose Bierce had little respect for
the bench and bar, his critique of law and lawyers, spread brilliantly
across the full spectrum of his written work, requires us to respect him
as one of the foremost critics of the legal system of Gilded Age
America.
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